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WHAT COURTS CAN DO IN THE FACE OF
THE NEVER-ENDING ASBESTOS CRISIS
Paul F. Rothstein*
For more than twenty-five years, state and federal courts
across the country have struggled to respond to an everexpanding asbestos litigation crisis. 1 Over $20 billion and
thirty bankruptcies later, more asbestos claims are filed now
than ever before. 2 Many predict that the number of claims
(and the number of bankruptcies) will only keep increasing
and that tens of billions of additional dollars will be spent.3

• Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Professor Rothstein is
author of Evidence: Cases, Materials and Problems, Evidence in a Nutshell: State
and Federal Rules of Evidence and several other books as well as over 100
articles. The preparation of this article was made possible by funding from the
Coalition for Asbestos Justice, Inc.
'One of the first major asbestos-liability cases was Borel v. Fibreboard Corp.,
493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), where the court of appeals affirmed a verdict
against an asbestos defendant on a strict liability theory.
2 See
Harold Brubaker, Three Major Firms Have Filed for Bankruptcy
Protection from Asbestos Claims, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 13, 2001 (describing the
history of Crown Cork & Seal which, for three months in the early 1960s, owned
a company that made one product that allegedly contained asbestos and still
spent $90 million on asbestos claims in 2000 alone); John Rooney, Evolution, Not
End, Seen for Asbestos Litigation, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 21, 2001; A Trail of
Toxic Torts: Fresh Asbestos Trouble for Insurers, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 27, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 7317425.
3 See
The Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act: Hearing on H.R. 1283
Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Congo (1999) [hereinafter
Hearings) (statement of Christopher Edley, Jr., Professor, Harvard Law School);
Christopher Bowe, The Americas: Asbestos Sparks New Jitters in US Litigation,
FIN. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2001; Queena Sook Kim, Asbestos Claims Continue to Mount,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2001, at B1, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 2853509; Richard B.
Schmitt, How Plaintiffs' Lawyers Have Turned Asbestos into a Court Perennial,
WALL ST. J., March 5, 2001, at A-I, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 2856111. A.M.
Best Co. recently estimated that asbestos claims could ultimately cost the
insurance industry $65 billion. Lorraine Gorski, Asbestos Claims Surge Set to
Dampen Earnings for Commercial Insurers, BESTWIRE, May 8, 2001. Additional
billions of dollars would be incurred by defendants themselves. A recent study by
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Despite the lengthy history of asbestos litigation, our
courts have not been able to develop a coordinated,
comprehensive and fair method to resolve the asbestos
problem. Judges, in an effort to clear their dockets, have often
adopted case management techniques that have actually
encouraged more and more asbestos claims, particularly by
claimants who are, at best, mildly impaired or more recently,
not sick at all. 4 As a result, plaintiffs with no physical
impairment receive windfall settlements that reduce the
amount of funds available to pay the claims of those who are
truly sick or who may become truly sick. At the same time,
many of these case management techniques have limited the
procedural protections typically available to tort defendants.
Without a fair and rational method of resolving asbestos
claims in the tort system, and with federal legislation
remaining highly speculative, defendants have increasingly
been forced into bankruptcy courts. 5 That outcome benefits no
one. Plaintiffs suffer because the limited pool of funds
available to pay asbestos claims is "steadily being depleted,»6
making it more likely that claimants who develop a serious
asbestos-related illness will not receive adequate or timely
compensation in the future. 7 Bankrupt companies may have
to layoff employees, close plants and cut back on core
business practices-matters which can be significant to the
Tillinghast-Towers Perrin estimates that the ultimate cost will reach $200 billion,
of which 39% will be borne by defendants and 61% by U.S. or foreign insurers.
Tillinghast-Towers Perrin Estimates Claims Associated with U.S. Asbestos Exposure
Will Ultimately Cost $200 Billion, Bus. WIRE, June 12, 2001 [hereinafter
Tillinghast-Towers).
• The Asbestos Blob, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2001, at A-14, available at 2001
WL-WSJ 2868353.
6 Since the beginning of 2000, seven major asbestos defendants, including
U.S. Gypsum in June 2001, have filed for bankruptcy. See Daniel Gross, Recovery
Lessons from an Industrial Phoenix, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2001, at Bus. 4; Sabrina
Jones, It's Been 38 Years Since W.R . . . . , WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2001, at E-1
(discussing the claims against W.R. Grace which filed for bankruptcy shortly after
the article was published), available at 2001 WL 2552120.
6 In re Collins, 233 F.3d 809, 812 (3d Cir. 2000).
7 See Queena Sook Kim, Firms Hit by Asbestos Litigation Take Bankruptcy
Route, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2000, at B4, available at 2000 WL-WSJ 26620724;
Mark D. Plevin et aI., Don't Bankrupt Asbestos, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 19, 2001, at
68.
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local or national economy.s And, in consequence,. some other
good, safe, even beneficial, non-asbestos products may no
longer become available, either because of the financial
problems of the company or because the company or other
companies, perhaps unreasonably, fear liability. Bankruptcies
are also bad news for remaining defendants that have only a
remote connection to asbestos such as oil companies, hospitals,
colleges and many local "mom and pop" small businesses. 9
Plaintiffs seek compensation from these peripheral defendants
to make up for the loss of funds from larger, more culpable
companies that have gone into bankruptcy.lO This has a
domino effect that results in additional defendants filing for
bankruptcy. 11

• Financial problems are of course faced by companies that have not filed for
bankruptcy protection. "Every company that is a defendant in asbestos litigation"
sees these lawsuits "sop up cash flow, diverting money that could be used to
develop new products, hire new employees, and build new plants." Brubaker,
supra note 2. The stock values of these companies plummet because "Wall Street
loathes the uncertainty of a liability that seems to have no end." Id.; see also The
People v. America Inc.: American Companies in Court, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 24,
2001 (discussing the fmancial scrutiny being faced by companies with even the
most remote connection to asbestos claims), available at 2001 WL 7318244.
9
Deepa Babington, Lawyers Seek New Asbestos Targets After W.R. Grace,
REUTERS, Apr. 2, 2001; Cy Goldberg & Darren Check, Bullseye Gets Bigger on
Peripheral Defendants: The Effect of Bankruptcies on Asbestos Litigation, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 25, 2001; Adrian Michaels, Problem of Cash Reserves to Meet
Rising Claims, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2001, at 3.
10 U.S. Gypsum filed for bankruptcy in June 2001 citing political changes in
the U.S. Senate which it believed made asbestos legislation less likely. USG Says
It May Seek Bankruptcy Protection, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2001, at A-12, available
at 2001 WL-WSJ 2865545. U.S. Gypsum had been lobbying Congress for a
legislative solution but pointed to slower progress than expected combined with
increasing settlement demands that are "completely out of proportion to our
. . . liability." Id. Crown, Cork and Seal spent $100 million on asbestos litigation
in 1999 and $160 million in 2000 and had estimated that its 2001 costs would be
$275 million. MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: AsBESTOS, May 18, 2001, at 13.
11 Bankruptcies have caused some plaintiffs' lawyers to file new claims at a
"dizzying pace." Bill Geroux, Asbestos Lawsuits Multiply: Bankruptcies Chief
Reason, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 28, 2001, at B-2, available at 2001 WL
5321831. As one publication that tracks asbestos litigation noted, "The cumulative
effect of bankruptcy reorganization by many large asbestos defendants has left
many of the remaining companies reeling as new claims remain on the rise with
no end in sight." MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: AsBESTOS, May 18, 2001, at 13. That
article reported the claim data for the following non-bankrupt defendants: (1)

HeinOnline -- 71 Miss. L.J. 3 2001-2002

4

MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 71

The purpose of this article is not to argue that claimants
suffering from serious asbestos-related diseases should not be
compensated. To the contrary, one of the points of this article
is that absent some change in the way asbestos claims are
resolved,12 claimants who become truly sick in the future
may not receive adequate compensation. Changing the current
asbestos compensation system would be pro-claimant.
Also, the purpose of this article is not to ascribe blame.
Rather, it is to fix. a problem. The judges cannot be blamed for
their good intentions. Neither can the plaintiffs' attorneys be
blamed for zealously representing their clients-which is what
they are doing here. 13 This normally produces great social
good. However, in the case of asbestos, a seriously flawed
system has resulted.
I. THE CURRENT ASBESTOS CRISIS
No one could have predicted that more than twenty-five
years after asbestos product liability litigation emerged, courts
would still be facing tens of thousands of new claims each
year. Certainly no one would have predicted that by the year
2000, over 200,000 asbestos cases would be clogging the courts
with new claims increasing at a staggering rate. In fact, new
claims against the largest asbestos defendants have averaged
approximately 40,000 per year over the past several years. 14
Two examples are noteworthy. In the year 2000 alone,
60,000 claims were filed against the Manville Trust-a Trust
established to handle asbestos claims against Johns-Manville
Corp., which filed for bankruptcy in 1982. The year 2000 ava-

Owens-Illinois - 20,000 new claims in 2000 (compared to 12,000 new claims in
1999), (2) Federal Mogul - 39,000 new claims in 2000, (3) Pfizer - 33,165
pending claims against itself and 58,346 pending claims against its Quigley
subsidiary in 2000 (compared to 26,890 pending claims against Pfizer in 1999 and
57,328 pending claims against Quigley in 1999). Id.
• 2 For a discussion concerning recent efforts to pass asbestos legislation, see
James Reed, Federal Asbestos Legislation: The Search for a Strategy, HARRIS
MARTIN COLUMNS: AsBESTOS, Apr. 2001 .
• 3 They also get paid but so do the lawyers and businessmen on the other
side. A system that pays people to look out for the interests of others is not a
bad system ..
'4 See Hearings, supra note 3.
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lanche represented the greatest number of claims filed against
Manville since 1989, the Trust's first full year of operation. 15
The Trust also estimates that there will be 50% more claims
in 2001 than the previous high-water mark set a year earlier. 16 Because of the flood of new claims, the Trust imposed a
sixty-day moratorium to determine if it could continue to pay
claims as it has inthe past.17
Similarly, in a recent filing in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, W.R. Grace & Co.
stated that in 2000 asbestos claims had increased 81% over
the prior year, reaching a total of 49,000 claims.ls Moreover,
in January of 2001, claims against W.R. Grace had increased
374% over those in January of 2000, and February of 2001
claims were 207% higher than February of 2000. 19
Defendants have settled well over 300,000 claims, but
these efforts to resolve the claims have failed to reduce the
caseload. One defendant, Owens Corning, devised a National
Settlement Program to settle as many claims as possible. That
Settlement Program was cited by opponents of legislative
reform as an example of why asbestos legislation was not
necessary.20 But even after settling hundreds of thousands of
claims, Owens Corning was forced to file for bankruptcy because claimants continued to bring more and more claims
seeking larger and larger settlements. 21

15 See Letter from David Austern, President, Claims Resolution Management
Corporation, to Attorneys Who File Manville Trust Claims (Mar. 26, 2001) (on file
with author).
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 W.R. Grace & Coo's Informational Brief at 38, In re W.R. Grace & Co.
(Bankr. D. DeL Apr. 2, 2001) (No. 01-01139).
19 Id. at 38-39. As a historical marker, prior to 1980, there were approximately 950 cases pending in the federal courts. See TERRENCE DUNGWORTH, PRODUCT
LIABILITY AND THE BUSINESS SECTOR: LITIGATION TRENDS IN FEDERAL COURTS 36
(1988). By 1985, that number increased four-fold to over 37,000 cases. [d.; see
also DEBORAH R. HENSLER, AsBESTOS LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A BRIEF
OVERVIEW 3 (1992).
20 See
H.R. REP. No. 106-782, at 67 (2000) (describing the Justice
Department's views on behalf of the Clinton Administration).
21 Owens Corning Files Voluntary Chapter 11 Petition to Resolve Asbestos
Liability, PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 5, 2000; Joseph B. White & Jim VandeHei, Owens
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While the initial focus of asbestos litigation was the asbestos producers and the manufacturers of asbestos products,
over time the pool of defendants has grown. More than 2000
companies or individuals have been named as asbestos defendants in courts across the country, and the number of defendants is growing. 22 As the primary asbestos defendants have
declared bankruptcy, the list of defendants has been expanded
to include companies with little more than a remote connection to asbestos. 23 The new defendants are diverse, ranging
from oil companies, to automobile manufacturers, to hospitals
and colleges. They generally have an attenuated connection to
asbestos. 24 Some of these peripheral defendants have already
sought bankruptcy protection. 25
Perhaps these developments in asbestos litigation-a
substantial increase in both the number of claims and the
number of peripheral defendants-would be understandable if
the number of sick claimants were also increasing. But that is
not the case. The bulk of the new cases are being filed by
people who are not sick in a meaningful sense. As many as
80% of new cases are brought by plaintiffs who suffer from no
physical impairment,26 and it is likely that most of these

Corning Files for Chapter 11, Citing Escalating Asbestos.Liability Claims, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 6, 2000, at A3, available at 2000 WL-WSJ 22612276.
22 See Innocent Hurt in Asbestos Suits, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 3, 2001, at 21,
available at 2001 WL 7240088; Douglas McLeod, Asbestos Continues to Bite Indus·
try, Bus. INS., Jan. 8, 2001, at 1, available at 2001 WL 5100719.
23 See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
2. Susan Warren, Asbestos Suits Target Makers of Wine, Cars, Soups, Soaps,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2000, at Bl, available at 2000 WL-WSJ 3025073; see also
Brubaker, supra note 2 (discussing order requiring Sears to pay $1.5 million to a
seventy-eight-year-old man who purchased building materials containing asbestos
from Sears fifty years ago).
25 See, e.g., Engineering Firm Burns & Roe Files for Reorganization, Cites Recent Spike in Claims, MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: AsBESTOS, Jan. 5, 2001, at l.
26 See Queena Sook Kim, G·I Holdings' Bankruptcy Filing Cites Exposure in
Asbestos Cases, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2001, at B12 (citing report from G-I Holdings, formerly GAF Corp., that "as many as 80% of its asbestos settlements are
paid to unimpaired people"), available at 2001 WL-WSJ 2850312; see also Lester
Brickman, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Is There a Need for an Administrative
Alternative?, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1819, 1853 (1992) (stating that in 1992, claims
by the unimpaired "account[edl for sixty to seventy percent of new asbestos
claims filed."). Allegations typically assert that plaintiffs may have future harm or
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plaintiffs will never become ill from their exposure to asbestoS. 27 If they had little or no costs, particularly to those who
are or will become more compellingly ill, suits by such claimants might be considered just. Yet the lawsuits by these relatively unimpaired claimants are allowed to proceed and reduce
the limited pool of resources available for those individuals
who are much sicker or dying or will become sick with serious
asbestos-related diseases in the future.
That funds may not be available for these latter individuals has been apparent since the early 1990s. In 1990, Chief
Justice Rehnquist convened a Judicial Conference Committee
to examine the growing asbestos litigation problem. 28 Mter
extensive study, the Committee reported in 1991 that the
"situation has reached critical dimensions and is getting
worse. "29 Characterizing the state of asbestos litigation as "a
disaster of major proportions to both the victims and the producers of asbestos products," the Committee concluded that
the courts were "ill-equipped" to address the mass of claims in
an effective manner. 30 The increasing caseload made long
pre-trial delays increasingly "routine," while the continuing
exhaustion of defendants' assets has raised a real prospect
that "future claimants may lose altogether."31
Recent awards to unimpaired or mildly impaired claim-

have only pleural plaques. "[Pleural) plaques are areas of (the pleura membrane
covering the lung and chest wall) in which cell tissue is replaced by tougher
tissue. Pleural plaques result from asbestos exposure 'but do not affect lung functions and do not necessarily lead to asbestosis or increase the risk of cancer.'"
Hearings, supra note 3 (statement of William N. Eskridge, Jr., Professor, Yale
Law School).
27 See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 746-47, 750-51,
812 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992), on reh'g, 993 F.2d 7
(2d Cir. 1993) (discussing the mass, assembly-line medical screening programs
employed by some attorneys for claimants); see also Tillinghast.Towers, supra note
3 (indicating a significant majority of new claims are for non-malignant diseases).
28 Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Comm. on Asbestos Litig., Report to the Chief
Justice of the United States and Members of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, MEALEY'S LITlG. REP.: AsBESTOS, Mar. 15, 1991, at 3.
29 Id. at 2.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 3; see In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 746-47,
750-51, 812 (describing the backlog of asbestos personal injury cases).
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ants illustrate the Committee's concern that truly sick claimants may face a depleted pool of assets in the future. In October of 2001, a Mississippi jury awarded six. asbestos plaintiffs
$150 million-$25 million each-even though none of the
plaintiffs are sick from asbestos and may never become SO.32
The plaintiffs claimed that in the future they may suffer asbestos-related diseases because their work, often decades ago,
brought them into contact with asbestos-containing products.
In March of 2001 a Texas jury awarded twenty-two plaintiffs,
who were not seriously ill, $35. million for "future physical
impairment" and "future medical costs although it is likely
that these claimants will never become seriously ill. "33 There
are many similar examples. In February of 1998, a Texas jury
awarded $115.6 million in damages 34 to twenty-one plaintiffs
whose illnesses ranged from "mild" to "asymptomatic" asbestosis, and even to "unconfirmed" illnesses. 35 Also in 1998, a
Mississippi state jury awarded between $2 million and $3.5
million to two plaintiffs whose alleged asbestosis could not be
detected by x-ray examinations. 36
How did we get here? Unfortunately, the courts themselves must share some of the responsibility. Many courts
have adopted substantive or procedural mechanisms designed
to streamline court dockets and move these cases through the
system, without regard to the merits of the claims. While
these judges undoubtedly had good intentions, they have actually made things worse by encouraging the filing and settlement of questionable claims. 37 As one commentator noted
See Margaret Cronin Fisk, Jury Awards Six Asbestos Plaintiffs $25M Each,
NAT'L L.J., Nov. 12, 2001, at Bl; Patti Waldmeir, The Need for Damage Limitation, FIN. TIMES (FT.com), Nov. 15, 2001, available at 2001 WL 28473877
33 Two Asbestos Defendants Hit with $35 Million Verdict, 23 No.4, ANDREWS
AsBESTOS LITIG. REP., Mar. 1, 2001, at 3.
3. This $115.6 million included $15.6 million in compensatory damages and
$100 million in punitive damages. McLeod, supra note 22.
35 Id.
36 Hearings, supra note 3. See generally Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, A
Letter to the Nation's Trial Judges: How the Focus on Effu:iency Is Hurting You
and Innocent Victims in Asbestos Liability Cases, 24 AM. J. TRIAL Anvoc. 247
(2000).
37 For example, the court administrator in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, noted that
"We are victims of our own success." Cuyahoga Asbestos Cases Abound, DAYTON
32
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nearly four years ago,
Judges who move large numbers of highly elastic mass torts
through their litigation process at low transaction costs create
the opportunity for new filings. They increase demand for
new cases by their high resolution rates and low transaction
costs. If you build a superhighway, there will be a traffic
jam. 3S

In the federal courts, all asbestos claims have been consolidated for pre-trial purposes before Senior United States District Judge Charles R. Weiner of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (the federal MDL Panel). Thus, the same procedural
rules implemented by the court, such as the severing of all
punitive damages claims,39 have been used in connection with
tens of thousands of claims. But state courts have adopted
different and, often, contradictory rules. For example, some
courts place suits brought by unimpaired claimants on an inactive docket so that the seriously ill can be compensated first.
Other courts however, such as courts in Mississippi,40 consolidate thousands of claims of relatively unimpaired people with
the claims of those who are quite sick or dying. This practice
tends to overcompensate the relatively unimpaired at the expense of the very sick. This lack of coordination can best be
demonstrated with some concrete examples.

DAILY NEWS, May 14, 2001, at 2-B, available at 2001 WL 21258316. That court's
cases have grown from 4000 to 27,000 in just four years and the court "has become so experienced at handling asbestos cases that even people who never lived
or worked in Ohio file their lawsuits in the court." Id.
38 Francis E. McGovern, The Defensive Use of Federal Class Actions in Mass
Torts, 39 ARIz. L. REV. 595, 606 (1997).
39 In re Collins, 233 F.3d 809, 812 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom., Collins v. Mac-Millan Bloedel, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 2216 (2001).
See, e.g., John Porretto, Rural County Known for Huge Verdicts, BILOXI SUN
HERALD, July 2, 2001 (discussing the negative impact on jobs, the cost of
healthcare and availability of insurance); see also supra note 36.

4.
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II. THE LACK OF COORDINATION AMONG THE COURTS
Early rulings in favor of asbestos claimants often resulted
from the willingness of courts to stretch accepted legal principIes or develop new theories that permitted claims where traditional theories would have denied recovery. While clearly the
result of good intentions--compensating people harmed by
asbestos-such rulings only tended to encourage unmeritorious
lawsuits. Faced with the addition of thousands of asbestos
cases to their dockets, courts began to use a wide variety of
substantive and procedural methods to try to manage the everincreasing caseload. Some of these mechanisms sought to take
into account the problems posed by asbestos litigation such as
limited resources and suits by unimpaired claimants. But most
of the procedures adopted by the courts were designed to move
cases along as if efficiency and expediency were the only important factors; they ignored the prospect that claimants who
actually become seriously ill in the future may not be adequately compensated, ignored important rights of defendants and
ignored the impact of increasing numbers of defendant bankruptcies.
The different ways that courts have addressed the asbestos
problem, can be seen by (1) the response by courts to the filings
by unimpaired claimants, (2) the use by courts of mass joinders
or mass trials in certain states, (3) the willingness of courts to
permit the award of medical monitoring costs and (4) the failure of courts to account for the impact of punitive damages,
including their in terrorem effect at the settlement table.

A. Addressing the Dilemma of the Unimpaired Claimant
At the heart of the current asbestos problem are claims
brought by individuals who are not seriously ill or who may
never become sick at all. As noted above, a large number of
cases filed against asbestos defendants are filed by plaintiffs
with no serious physical impairments. When these weak cases
are consolidated with other cases, or when courts force settlements of these weak cases by allowing the claims of the truly
sick to be leveraged, the plaintiffs who are not ill use the plain-
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tiffs who are seriously ill to "inflate the value of those
claims."41 Plaintiffs who are not seriously ill and suffer no
physical impairment receive recoveries to the detriment of
those plaintiffs who are seriously ill and dying.
Only a relatively small portion of the current nationwide
burden of asbestos lawsuits involves serious injuries. 42 Only a
small fraction of the cases present claims of severe asbestosis
or asbestos-related malignancies such as lung cancer or mesothelioma. Far greater numbers involve conditions which, if
present at all, are associated with little or no actual
impairment. 43 This has led Judge Weiner, who oversees the
federal asbestos multidistrict proceedings, to note that "[o]nly a
very small percentage of the cases filed have serious asbestosrelated affiictions, but they are prone to be lost in the shuffle
with pleural and other non-malignancy cases."44 The influx of
large numbers of claims by the relatively unimpaired defeats
the purpose of the tort system: "that the sick and dying, their
widows and survivors should have their claims addressed
first.»45 Claimants' attorneys understandably fear, however,

.1 Hearings, supra note 3; see also Patricia Waldmeir, A Legal System Insulated from Logic: A New Surge of Asbestos Lawsuits is Bankrupting U.S. Business
and Exposing the Failings of the Law, FIN. TIMES, June 7, 2001, at 12 .
.. As Judge Weinstein has pointed out, large numbers of claims by plaintiffs
without serious injury are often generated as a result of mass, "assembly-line"
medical screening programs:
[Some attorneys] have filed all of their cases without regard to the extent
of injury. In conjunction with unions they have arranged through the use
of medical trailers and the like to have x-rays taken of thousands of
workers without manifestations of disease and then filed complaints for
those that had any hint of pleural plaque.
In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 748 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992), on reh'g, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993).
• 3 See In re Haw. Fed. Asbestos Cases, 734 F. Supp. 1563, 1567 (D. Haw.
1990) ("In virtually all pleural plaque and pleural thickening cases, plaintiffs
continue to lead active, normal lives, with no pain or suffering, no loss of the use
of an organ or disfigurement due to scarring.") .
.. In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 1996 WL 539589, at *1 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 12, 1996).
45 In re Patenaude, 210 F.3d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S.
1011 (2000). See generally Mark A. Behrens & Monica Parham, Stewardship for
the Sick: Preserving Assets for Asbestos Victims Through Inactive Docket Programs,
33 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2001); Peter H. Schuck, The Worst Should Go First:
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that if they don't file claims for their relatively unimpaired clients, the statute of limitations may have run if and when the
clients do become seriously ill. It is a valid concern and drives
some of the problem.
To date, only a handful of courts, such as the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, have been willing to take steps to address this problem. That court has ruled that asymptomatic
pleural thickening, unaccompanied by physical impairment, is
not a compensable injury that gives rise to a cause of action. 46
Further, the court held that the discovery of pleural plaques or
a non-malignant, asbestos-related lung pathology "does not
trigger the statute of limitations with respect to an action for
later, separately diagnosed disease of lung cancer.'>47 The court
added "because asymptomatic pleural thickening is not a sufficient physical injury, the resultant emotional distress damages
are likewise not recoverable.oMs
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision is an important step in the right direction. First, the court's ruling ensures
that those who are not seriously ill will not threaten the right
to compensation of those who are. 49 Second, the court affirmed
that individuals need not file claims simply to avoid any statute of limitations issues; absent physical impairment the clock
does not run. 50
Cognizant of both the statute of limitations issue and the
problems posed by unimpaired claimants, a few other courts
have created pleural registries or inactive dockets pursuant to
which the claims of those who cannot meet certain objective
medical criteria are placed on an inactive docket where statute
of limitations and similar defenses are tolled. For example, the
Massachusetts inactive asbestos docket was created in Septem-

Deferral Registries in Asbestos Litigation, 15 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POLY 541 (1992) .
• 6 See Simmons v. Pacor, Inc., 674 A.2d 232, 237 (Pa. 1996) (upholding GitTear
v. Johns-Manville Corp., 632 A.2d 880 (Pa. 1993».
47 Simnwns, 674 A.2d at 237 .
•• [d. at 238.
•• See Report of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and the Working
Group on Mass Torts, Report on Mass Tort Litigation 2 (Feb. 15, 1999) (comments of John Aldock, Esq., participant in Dec. 8, 1998, Mass Torts Working
Group Conference).
6.

[d.
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ber of 1986 through an amendment to an order creating a
statewide consolidated asbestos docket. 51 The docket provides
a mechanism by which plaintiffs who have been diagnosed with
asbestos-related pleural diseases can toll all applicable statutes
of limitations regarding their claims or the related claims of
their families or estates, until their pleural conditions developed into either asbestosis or some type of malignancy. 52
While on the inactive docket, cases are exempt from discovery.53
Similarly, the Circuit Court for Cook County, Illinois, created a pleural registry system in March of 1991. 54 In creating
that system, the court recognized that asbestos litigation posed
problems for parties: plaintiffs exhibiting no impairment filed
claims out of fear that the statute of limitations would expire
before their disease progressed to a stage that was medically
recognized as impaired, while defendants expended substantial
sums in appearing in and defending against such inchoate
claims.55
Under the Coqk County plan, claimants must file an Asbestos Personal Injury Information Sheet. 56 Cases in which an
asbestos-related cancer or mesothelioma is alleged may immediately go on the active docket. 57 Claimants who have a history of asbestos exposure and demonstrate objective asbestos-

51 See Commonwealth of Mass., Middlesex Super. Ct., MAsSACHUSETrS STATE
COURT AsBESTOS PERSONAL INJURY LITlG. ORDER, Sept. 1986.
52 Id.
53 Id. Similarly, pleural cases originally filed in the consolidated docket may
be transferred to the inactive docket on plaintifi's motion, and thereafter become
subject to all of the same provisions and requirements as cases originally filed on
the inactive docket. Id.
54 See Order to Establish Registry for Certain Asbestos Matters, In re Asbestos Cases (Cir. Ct., Cook County, Ill. Mar. 26, 1991) [hereinafter Registry Order!.
The pleural registry in Cook County was created by Judge Dean Trafalet who
handled the asbestos cases for a fourteen-year period that ended in 1998. When
Judge Trafalet took over the asbestos cases there were 8000 cases pending, but
today there are about 875 pending cases with another 1200 cases on the pleural
registry. See Rooney, supra note 2.
.. Registry Order, supra note 54.
56 Id. All claims must be filed individually, as the Order prohibits claims on
behalf of groups or classes of claimants. Id.
57 Id.
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related physical findings (such as pleural plaques) but who
either do not meet the minimum criteria for impairment, as
defined in the Order, or who have not manifested a cancer
certified as asbestos-related, as defined in the Order, place
their claims on the registry.58 While on the registry, claims
are exempt from discovery and "shall not 'age' for any purpose."59
Other courts have also begun to acknowledge the unimpaired claimant problem. Recently, the Texas Supreme Court
addressed a statute of limitations question arising out of an
asbestos claim and, in that context, noted the problems raised
by compensating unimpaired claimants. In Pustejovsky v. Rapid American Corp.,60 the issue before the court was whether a
plaintiff could bring separate actions for separate latent asbestos diseases. 61 The court found that a claim for malignant asbestos disease would not be barred by the statute of limitations
even where a previous claim for asbestos exposure or minimal
impairment had been filed. The court concluded that it was
better to allow the second action because otherwise, claimants
would feel compelled to bring premature and vague claims
(such as fear of cancer) to avoid statute of limitations issues.
The court specifically identified its concern that giving damages
to claimants who are not sick in a meaningful sense would
result in the overcompensation of those who do not get a disease and a "systematic under-compensation" for those who
do. 62

B. Mass Joinders and Mass Trials
Perhaps the most troubling procedural mechanism used by
courts to resolve large numbers of asbestos claims has been the
mass joinder or mass trial of thousands of individual claims

Id.
Id.
60 35 S.W.3d 643 (Tex. 2000).
61 The court noted that it had previously held that a claimant who had been
exposed to asbestos but had not developed a serious asbestos-related disease could
not bring a claim for fear of developing such disease. Pustejovsky, 35 S.W.3d at
648-50.
62 Id. at 650.
58

59
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which include claims by both those who are demonstrably sick
and those who are unimpaired. The use of this procedural conglomeration threatens both the right of the seriously ill plaintiffs to be fully compensated and the right of defendants to fair
process.
1. Mississippi
Although Mississippi does not have court procedures that
allow for class actions, Mississippi joinder rules do allow for the
joinder of hundreds or thousands of claimants from across the
country in one case. Under Mississippi rules, it does not matter
how many plaintiffs are from out-of-state so long as one of the
plaintiffs is a Mississippi resident who is suing one out-of-state
defendant. 63 This "one and all" rule is procedurally similar to
class actions but without the same level of protection. 64 Mass
joinder of asbestos claims in Mississippi courts, in conjunction
with Mississippi rules that provide limited time for discovery,
can be used to limit the procedural protections to which defendants are generally entitled. 65
A Mississippi case that highlights the problem is Cosey v.
E.n. Bullard CO.,66 a consolidated case where a trial involving
twelve of the 1738 plaintiffs resulted in a jury verdict of $48.5
million. 67 The judge advised the defendants to settle with the

.. See Mark Ballard, Mississippi Becomes a Mecca for Tort Suits, NATL L.J.,
Apr. 27, 2001 (describing Mississippi as "mecca for plaintiffs lawyers"); Stephen
Labatron, Top Asbestos Makers Agree to Settle 2 Large Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
23, 2000, at 22.
64 See, e.g., MISS. UNIF. R. OF CIR. & COUNTY CT. PRAC. § 4.04A (requiring
that discovery be completed within ninety days of filing of answer).
65 According to one former Chief Justice of the Mississippi Supreme Court, the
joinder rules were never intended to authorize the type of "quasi-class litigation"
that takes place. Jerry Mitchell, Out-of-State Cases, In-State Headaches, CLARIONLEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), June 17, 2001, at I-A. If this multi-claimant litigation
had been intended, a class action rule would have been proposed, according to another former Mississippi Supreme Court Chief Justice, who added that "[w)e did
not favor class-action suits for reasons that it was burdensome, and our courts
weren't equipped to handle them." Id. Other procedural mechanisms in Mississippi
attract asbestos claimants. Labatron, supra note 63. For example, in Mississippi
defendants have no right to perform medical exams. See id.
66 Civ. No. 95-0069 (Cir. Ct., Jefferson County, Miss. 1995).
67 Motion for Disqualification and Recusal of Judge at 5, Cosey, Civ. No. 95-
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remaining plaintiffs, or he would try them immediately in front
of the same jury, with an instruction to find the defendants liable. 68 When counsel for the defendants said the plan sounded
"like this side of hell," the judge corrected him saying, "No
counsel, this is hell."69 As one defendant's general counsel remarked, "It's no secret that there are state courtrooms in Mississippi which have become notorious for awarding outlandish
verdicts to asbestos claimants who are not sick and as a result,
asbestos cases from all over the country tend to migrate
there.,,7o
Not surprisingly, Mississippi's rules have resulted in forum-shopping. 71 Over the past few years the number of plaintiffs filing suit in Jefferson County has exceeded the number of
Jefferson County residents. 72 In early 2001, two new asbestos
suits were filed in Mississippi, one including over 2000 claimants 73 and a second involving over 7000 claimants,74 a majority of whom did not reside in Mississippi. Unfortunately, it appears this trend will continue. The Mississippi Supreme Court
recently rejected a request to correct the problem in American
Bankers Insurance Co. v. Alexander.75 There the court affirmed the joinder of 1371 plaintiffs in a case in Jefferson
County, and made no attempt to change Mississippi's joinder rules. 76
0069 [hereinafter Motion to Recusel. Punitive damages were to be decided in a
separate phase of the trial. Id.
68 Id.
at 5-6; see also Hearings, supra note 3 (noting that the plaintiffs in
Cosey, whose disease could not be detected by x-ray, were awarded between $2
million and $3.5 million each).
69 Motion to Recuse, supra note 67, at 6.
70 Labatron, supra note 63 (quoting Richard A. Weinberg, General Counsel for
GAF Corp.).
71 See
The Cloud Grows Darker over Our Judiciary System, THE TIMES
(Lamar County, Miss.), June 28, 2001 (describing efforts to sign up plaintiffs to
bring suit in certain Mississippi counties).
72 Jerry Mitchell, Jefferson County Ground Zero for Cases, CLARION-LEDGER
(Jackson, Miss.), June 17, 2001, at I-A. Since 1999, the number of plaintiffs that
have filed suit in Jefferson County, Mississippi (more than 10,000), has outnumbered the total number of people in the county (9740). Id.
73 Third Amended Complaint 1, Ex. A at 1-31, Bankston v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., No. 2000-17-CVI (Cir. Ct., Jones County, Miss. Mar. 20, 2001).
7. Amended Complaint 1, Ex. A at 1-146, Williams v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc.,
No. 2001-6-CV3 (Cir. Ct., Jones County, Miss. May 29, 2001).
75 No. 98-IA-0046-SCT, 2001 WL 83952 (Miss. Feb. 1, 2001).
76 Am. Bankers Ins. Co., 2001 WL 83952, at *1. Nevertheless, one current Su-
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2. West Virginia
The West Virginia courts have used mass trials for tens of
thousands of asbestos claims. Beginning with the first consolidated trial in 1989, over 20,000 asbestos claims have been
included in mass trial groupS.77 These trials did not address
all liability issues. Instead, there were no named plaintiffs presented to the jury, and the issue to be resolved was whether
any of the numerous defendants had either manufactured a
defective product or maintained a workplace which was not
reasonably safe. The mass trials also determined whether some
of the defendants had acted in a manner that would warrant
an award of punitive damages and asked the jury to develop a
"multiplier" for calculating such damages. 78 A second phase
was contemplated which would only then focus on the
defendant's liability and the amount of the compensatory damages. 79 Although the ostensible purpose of this procedure was
to avoid repetitive litigation, the goal was to "provide the opportunity for the parties to settle massive numbers of cases at
one sitting.,,80
In 1996, the West Virginia Supreme Court had the opportunity to address the viability of these mass trials in a situation where there were no common issues among the defendants
who each allegedly had maintained an unreasonably safe
workplace. 81 The plaintiffs had allegedly worked in various
facilities owned by different defendants all of which were in
West Virginia. 82 These "premises"-related defendants chal:·

preme Court Justice has expressed support for a rule addressing who can access
Mississippi courtrooms. See Toni Terrett, Supreme Court Justice Books Tort Reform, CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), June 18, 200l.
77 See Preliminary Reply of the Respondent, A. Andrew MacQueen, with Objections and Motions at 5, Mobile Oil Corp. v. MacQueen, No. 29768 (W. Va. May
25, 2001) [hereinafter Preliminary Reply of Judge MacQueenl.
7. Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 West Virginia ex ret. Appalachian Power Co. v. MacQueen, 479 S.E.2d 300
(W. Va. 1996).
82 MacQueen, 479 S.E.2d at 302.
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lenged the trial court's consolidation of a number of separate
civil actions filed on behalf of individuals who claimed physical
injuries stemming from asbestos exposure which occurred while
the plaintiffs were "constructing, repairing, and/or maintaining
various facilities" owned by the defendants. 83 The Supreme
Court of West Virginia ruled that the consolidation plan was
appropriate and provided the trial court with "broad authority"
for resolving as many claims as quickly as possible. 84
Until recently, however, it appeared that some change
might be forthcoming. The West Virginia Supreme Court
elected to consolidate virtually all West Virginia asbestos
claims before one judge under West Virginia's mass litigation
procedures. As part of the Mass Litigation Panel proceedings,
the judge in charge held a series of meetings with counsel for
plaintiffs and defendants to formulate a plan for proceeding
with the asbestos cases. S5 Plaintiffs sought to continue the
trial practices that made West Virginia an attractive jurisdic.tion. Plaintiffs requested "a consolidated, common issues trial
for all pending asbestos cases,,,S6 arguing that past consolidations "created important, substantive rights" and therefore, a
denial of those procedures in the future "raise [d) issues of a
denial of substantive due process and equal protection to the
... members of the ... class under both the Constitution of
West Virginia and the United States Constitution."87 The motion was denied, and the court instead scheduled "a series of
small-group, all-issues trials"s8 (although Judge MacQueen
argued that an inactive docket may violate the West Virginia

Id.
Id. at 305.
as Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Writ Granted as Moulded at 5, West Virginia ex rel. Ronald Allman v. MacQueen, No. 29767 (W. Va. July 6, 2001)
[hereinafter W. Va. Mandamus Ruling).
86 Plaintiffs Represented by the Law Offices of Stuart Calwell, PLLC; Peyton,
Parenti & Whittington; the Law Office of John E. Sutter; Hartley & O'Brien Law
Offices; James F. Humphrey & Associates, L.C.; and Harvit & Schwartz, L.C.'s
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Earlier Motion for Mass Trial at 1, In re
Asbestos Personal Injury Litigation, No. 00-Misc-222 (Cir. Ct. of Kanawha County,
W. Va. Mar. 16, 2001) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Motion for Mass Trial!.
87 Id. at 2.
88 W. Va. Mandamus Ruling, supra note 85, at 5.
83

84
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Constitution).89
Unfortunately, the West Virginia Supreme Court reversed
course and, while allowing at least some of the small-group, allissues trials to proceed, made clear that it expected to see larger consolidated trials. The court appointed a new "supervising
judge" to schedule a new series of meetings with counsel for
plaintiffs and defendants to consider the types of larger trial
groups that should be scheduled. 90 The court said that those
trial groups might include, among other things, "cases involving the premises liability theory," "cases with issues susceptible
to mass trial of all or most parties" and "cases involving common product exposure.,,91 Thus, mass trials will probably be
back in West Virginia in the future.

3. Maryland
Trial courts in Baltimore, Maryland, have also consolidated
thousands of asbestos claims. The first mass trial, held in 1992,
was broken into phases and, as in West Virginia, focused on
general issues of liability and punitive damages. Following the
mass trial, the court scheduled a series of smaller trial groups
or mini-trials to resolve the remaining issues specific to individual claimant issues. Rather than resolving claims quickly
and efficiently, ten years later these mini-trials have yet to be
concluded. 92 In February of this year, a judge in Baltimore
Circuit Court approved a settlement of over 6800 asbestosInjury cases, which had been pending in the system for
years. 93

Preliminary Reply of Judge MacQueen, supra note 77, at 1-2.
W. Va. Mandamus Ruling, supra note 85, at 17.
91 Id. at 18. The West Virginia Supreme Court noted that it believed that any
constitutional issues were premature because the specific types of trials to be held
had not been decided yet. Id.
92 Memorandum and Opinion, In re Baltimore City Asbestos Personal Injury
and Wrongful Death Cases, No. 92344501 {Baltimore Cir. Ct. May 9, 2001). In
order to avoid similar problems, the Baltimore court subsequently adopted an
inactive docket similar to those used in Massachusetts and Cook County, Illinois.
Id. at 2. Challenges to the viability of that inactive docket have been denied. Id.
93 Caitlin Francke, Asbestos Lawsuits to Be Settled, BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 14,
2001, at 1-B, auailable at 2001 WL 6150935.
89
90
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Mass trials and mass consolidations are perhaps the most
obvious examples of case management techniques designed to
resolve cases quickly but which actually end up encouraging
the filing of more asbestos claims. Such procedures take the
focus away from the merits of individual claims (while often
ignoring the due process rights of defendants) and allow nonmeritorious claims to flourish. More importantly, mass trials
and mass consolidations provide a mechanism which increases
the value of unimpaired claims at the expense of truly sick
plaintiffs, further reducing the limited pools of resources and
increasing the likelihood that future deserving claimants will
not be fully compensated.

C. Medical Monitoring
Plaintiffs in medical monitoring cases seek post-exposure,
pre-symptom recovery for the expense of periodic medical examinations to detect the onset of physical harm (which mayor
may not occur). Some courts have permitted recovery for medical monitoring, but many have rejected it. 94 Medical monitoring, like recovery for expected future impairment or fear thereof, may have its place in tort law, but in the asbestos litigation,
this device has become a caricature.
Recognition of medical monitoring absent physical injury
could have enormous consequences for asbestos litigation given
the massive number of individuals who were exposed to asbestos at some level. If even a small fraction of these individuals
were to seek recovery for medical monitoring, the effects on
future claimants, the court system and the remaining solvent
defendants could be far-reaching. As one court explained:
There is little doubt that millions of people have suffered
exposure to hazardous substances. Obviously, allowing individuals who have not suffered any demonstrable injury from
such exposure to recover the costs of future medical monitoring in a civil action could potentially devastate the court system as well as defendants .... Allowing today's generation of

94 See generally Victor E. Schwartz et aI., Medical Monitoring - Should Tort
Law Say Yes?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1057, 1059-71 (1999) (discussing the case
law on medical monitoring).
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exposed but uninjured plaintiffs to recover may lead to
tomorrow's generation of exposed and injured plaintiffs [sic]
being remediless. 95

These serious practical concerns led the United States
Supreme Court in Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. v.
Buckley 96 to reject medical monitoring in Federal Employers'
Liability Act (FELA)97 cases. 98 One of the Court's primary
concerns in Buckley was that medical monitoring would permit
literally "tens of millions of individuals" to justify "some form of
substance-exposure-related medical monitoring."99 As a result,
defendants would be exposed to unlimited liability, and a
"'flood' of less important cases" would drain the pool of resources available for meritorious claims by plaintiffs with serious,
present injury.loo The Court concluded:
[W]e are more troubled than is [the dissent] by the potential
systemic effects of creating a new, full-blown, tort law cause
of action-for example, the effects upon interests of other
potential plaintiffs who are not before the court and who
depend on a tort system that can distinguish between reliable
and serious claims on the one hand, and unreliable and relatively trivial claims on the other. IOI

Equally instructive on this point is the Texas Supreme
Court's more recent decision in Temple-Inland Forest Products
Corp. v. Carter. 102 In rejecting a "fear of disease" claim

.. Ball v. Joy Mfg. Co., 755 F. Supp. 1344, 1372. (S.D. W. Va. 1990), affd,
958 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1991).
.. 521 U.S. 424 (1997).
97 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1994). FELA is a federal statute that dermes rights
and duties in personal injury cases brought by railroad workers against their employer railroads. FELA is something like a tort equivalent of workers' compensation for the railroad field.
98 Buckley, 521 U.S. at 442-43.
99 Id. at 442.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 443-44. Similar concerns recently led the Nevada and Alabama Supreme Courts to reject medical monitoring in Badillo u. American Brands, Inc., 16
P.3d 435 (Nev. 2001), and Hinton ex rel. Hinton u. Monsanto Co., 2001 WL
1073699 (Ala. Sept. 14, 2001).
102 993 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. 1999).
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brought by a person who was exposed to asbestos, but had no
physical injury, the court explained:
The difficulty in predicting whether exposure will cause any
disease and if so, what disease, and the long latency period
characteristic of asbestos-related diseases, make it very difficult for judges and juries to evaluate which exposure claims
are serious and which are not. This difficulty in turn makes
liability unpredictable, with some claims resulting in significant recovery while virtually indistinguishable claims are
denied altogether. Some claimants would inevitably be overcompensated when, in the course of time, it happens that they
never develop the disease they feared, and others would be
undercompensated when it turns out that they developed a
disease more serious even than they feared. Also, claims for
exposure could proliferate because in our society, as the Supreme Court observed, "contacts, even extensive contacts, with
serious carcinogens are common. ,,103

For this reason, the Texas Supreme Court was reluctant to
stray from the bedrock rule, taken from the Restatement (Second) of Torts, that a showing of actual injury is an indispensable element of a tort cause of action. 104 The court stated: "If
recovery were allowed in the absence of present disease, individuals might feel obliged to bring suit for such recovery prophylactically, against the possibility of future consequences
from what is now an inchoate risk," which would "exacerbate
not only the multiplicity of suits but the unpredictability of results. "105
Sound public policy dictates that courts maintain the 200year-old principle that causes of action generally require proof
of a present physical injury.106 The traditional physical injury

Temple-Inland, 993 S.W.2d at 93 (emphasis added).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1965) (stating that defendant
should not be held liable for emotional disturbance absent physical injury); see
also Purjet v. Hess Oil V.1. Corp., 1986 WL 1200, *4 <n.V.1. Jan. 8, 1986) (applying Virgin Islands law) ("We are bound, however, to follow the Restatement's rule
that actual injury is an indispensable element of a tort cause of action," including
medical monitoring claims.)
lOS Temple-Inland, 993 S.W.2d at 93.
106 See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF
103
104
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rule serves a number of important functions with respect to
medical monitoring claims. First, it prevents courts from being
flooded with thousands of new claims. As one set of commentators has pointed out, with an estimated thirty-eight percent of
all cancers attributable to occupational exposure to toxic chemicals and 50,000 hazardous waste sites in the United States, "in
the very near future we may all have reasonable grounds to
allege that some negligent business exposed us to hazardous
substances and to get medical experts to testify that the exposure significantly increased our risk of disease."107 It was precisely this concern that persuaded the United States Supreme
Court to refuse to allow medical monitoring claims in the
Buckley decision. 108
Furthermore, medical monitoring awards are often totally
unnecessary. Most workers today already receive access to
medical check-ups through a health plan. l09 A tort award
would simply provide a windfall recovery. As the Supreme
Court noted in Buckley, "where state and federal regulations
already provide the relief that a [medical monitoring] plaintiff
seeks, creating a full-blown tort remedy could entail systemic
costs without corresponding benefits" because recovery would
be allowed "irrespective of the presence of a 'collateral
source.'"uo
In addition, medical monitoring awards are subject to serious abuse. If awarded in a lump-sum, there is no guarantee
that any recovery will actually be spent on medical monitorTORTS 361 (5th ed. 1984) (stating that the majority of courts do not allow recovery for mental distress unless there is a physical injury).
107 Susan L. Martin & Jonathan D. Martin, Tort Actions for MedicaL Monitor·
ing: Warranted or WastefuL?, 20 COLUM. J. ENvrL. L. 121, 130 (1995); see aLso
Andrew R. Klein, Rethinking MedicaL Monitoring, 64 BROOK. L. REV. I, 13 (1998)
("According to the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), biLLions of pounds of hazardous chemicals are emitted into the air each year, and
nearly twenty percent of the U.S. population (approximately 40 million people)
live within four miles of a hazardous waste site that the EPA has placed on its
National Priority List."} (footnotes omitted).
108 See Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 442 (1997).
109 Approximately eighty percent of all standard medical testing is paid for by
third-party insurance. 2 ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURy-REPORTERS' STUDY 379 (1991).
110 BuckLey, 521 U.S. at 443.
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ing. III In fact, evidence suggests that lump-sum awards are
more likely to be spent in the short-term than to be saved for
future medical monitoring.1I2 This will almost certainly be
true in the vast majority of cases where monitoring is already
provided by a "collateral source."
Moreover, the social risk associated with making medical
monitoring too readily available to the millions of persons in
our society who can claim exposure to toxic substances, including asbestos, will have the effect of compensating those who are
unimpaired or slightly impaired at the expense of those who
are seriously injured. When courts permit large damage awards
for medical monitoring, less money is available to compensate
those who have serious injuries or will develop serious injuries
in the future.
These serious problems will only be exacerbated if claimants seeking medical monitoring are permitted to pursue recovery through the vehicle of class action litigation. People who
suffer actual asbestos-related injuries may be unable to obtain
compensation for their injuries if funds are further depleted for
monitoring classes of individuals who have no present physical
injury, and may never become sick.
Despite these facts, some state courts still permit plaintiffs
to recover damages for medical monitoring even in the absence
of injury. In 1998, the Supreme Court of Louisiana, in a suit
brought on behalf of a class of plaintiffs that had not filed suit
for asbestos disease or injury, ruled that for an asymptomatic
claimant exposed to asbestos, "the reasonable cost of medical
monitoring is a compensable item of damage ... provided that
a plaintiff satisfies [certain) criteria."113 As a result of this

111 As one commentator has noted, "[tlhe incentive for healthy plaintiffs to
carefully hoard their award, and faithfully spend it on periodic medical examinations to detect an illness they will in all likelihood never contract, seems negligible." Arvin Maskin et aI., Medical Monitoring: A Viable Remedy for Deserving
Plaintiffs or Tort Law's Most Expensive Consolation Prize?, 27 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 521, 540-41 (2000).
112 George W.C. McCarter, Medical Sue· Veillance: A History and Critique of the
Medical Monitoring Remedy in Toxic Tort Litigation, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 227,
257 n.158 (1993) (footnote in title omitted).
113 Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 97-3188, pp. 8-9 (La. 7/8/98), 716 So.
2d 355, 360. The court identified seven criteria that needed to be established:
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ruling, the Louisiana Legislature amended its law to eliminate
medical monitoring as a compensable item. Specifically, the
amendment stated, "Damages do not include costs for future
medical treatment, services, surveillance, or procedures of any
kind unless such treatment, services, surveillance, or procedures are directly related to a manifest physical or mental
injury or disease.,,114
But in April of 2001, the Louisiana Supreme Court spoke
again on the issue, this time holding that the Legislature's
decision to eliminate medical monitoring was unconstitutional
to the extent that the law was applied retroactively (i.e., to the
extent the plaintiff already had a "vested property right" in a
cause of action it could not be divested by a subsequent statute).1l5 The upshot of the ruling was to permit large numbers
of claimants who acknowledged they were unimpaired to seek

(1)

Significant exposure to a proven hazardous substance.

(2) As a proximate result of the exposure, plaintiff suffers a significantly increased risk of contracting a serious latent disease.
(3) Plaintiffs risk of contracting such a serious latent disease is
greater than (a) the risk of contracting the same disease had he or she
not been exposed and (b) the chances of members of the public at large
of developing the disease.
(4) A monitoring procedure exists that makes the early detection of
the disease possible.
(5) The monitoring procedure has been prescribed by a qualified
physician and is reasonably necessary according to contemporary scientific
principles.
(6) The prescribed monitoring regime is different from that normally
recommended in the absence of exposure.
(7) There is some demonstrated clinical value in the early detection
and diagnosis of the disease.
Bourgeois, pp. 9-11, 716 So. 2d at 360-61. To this list, the court added that the
"costs must be both reasonable and limited in duration to the maximum latency
period (if known) of the diseases for which there is an increased risk." [d. at p. 11,
716 So. 2d at 361.
11. LA. ClV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West 1997 & Supp. 2001) (emphasis added).
115 Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 2000-1528, pp. 11-12 (La. 4/3/01), 783
So. 2d 1251, 1260-61.
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medical monitoring costs in the courts, depleting funds available to compensate those claimants who are or may become
sick. lls

D. Managing Punitive Damages Claims
Continuing to award punitive damages in asbestos cases no
longer makes sense. The purpose of punitive damages in product liability cases is to punish manufacturers for the injuries
their products caused and to deter others from doing the
same. ll7 It would be difficult to argue that punitive damages
awards in asbestos cases over the past twenty years have not
adequately punished asbestos manufacturers. Moreover, individuals responsible for decisions relating to asbestos products
no longer work at these corporations and in most cases are
dead. Punishing corporations for decisions made years before
the present management was in power does not serve the purpose of punitive damages.
When the threat of large punitive damage awards is used
to increase settlement amounts, punitive damages become a
means of extortion rather than the corrective and deterrent
they are intended to be. Thus, continued use of punitive damages not only violates a defendant's rights,118 it threatens fu116 The court held that because the plaintiffs, before passage of the statute,
had filed an amended petition alleging the seven criteria, they could pursue their
medical monitoring claims. Bourgeois II, p. 12, 783 So. 2d at 1260-61; see Crooks
v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 2001-0466, pp. 3-4 (La. 5/25/01), 785 So. 2d 810, 812
(stating that the court should determine whether the seven criteria from Bourgeois I occurred before Act 989 went into effect).
117 See, e.g., RESI'ATEMENT OF TORTS § 908 cmt. a (1939) (noting that the functions of punitive damages are punishment and deterrence); VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ
ET AL., PROSSER, WADE, AND SCHWARTZ'S CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 549
(lOth ed. 2000) (describing the origin and purpose of punitive damages).
118 See King v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 906 F.2d 1022, 1031 (5th Cir.
1990) ("It must be said that a strong arguable basis exists for applying the due
process clause . . . to a jury's award of punitive damages in a mass tort context."); Racich v. Celotex Corp., 887 F.2d 393, 398 (2d Cir. 1989) ("We agree that
the multiple imposition of punitive damages for the same course of conduct may
raise serious constitutional concerns, in the absence of any limiting principle.");
McBride v. Gen. Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563, 1570 (M.D. Ga. 1990) ("[Dlue
process may place a limit on the number of times and the extent to which a
defendant may be subjected to punishment for a single course of conduct.");
Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 705 F. Supp. 1053, 1064 (D.N.J. 1989) ("[T)he
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ture plaintiffs by driving defendant corporations into bankruptcy, thereby depleting the pool available for compensatory damages. 119
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
recently recognized many of these same concerns. In In re Collins,120 the Third Circuit had the opportunity to consider the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation's decision not to remand punitive damages claims for trial together with the remainder of personal injury claims arising from asbestos exposure. l2l The court was convinced that there was a "compelling" public policy rationale for severing the claimants' punitive
damage claims:
The resources available to persons injured by asbestos
are steadily being depleted. The continuing filings of
bankruptcy by asbestos defendants disclose that the process is
accelerating. It is responsible public policy to give priority to
compensatory claims over exemplary punitive damage windfalls; this prudent conservation more than vindicates the
Panel's decision to withhold punitive damage claims on remand. It is discouraging that while the Panel and transferee
court follow this enlightened practice, some state courts allow
punitive damages in asbestos cases. The continued hemorrhaging of available funds deprives current and future victims
of rightful compensation. 122

court holds that due process places a limit on the number of times and the extent to which a defendant may be subjected to punishment for a single course of
conduct. Regardless of whether a sanction is labeled 'civil' or 'criminal' in nature,
it cannot be tolerated under the requirements of due process if it amounts to
unrestricted punishment.").
119 See Edwards v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 911 F.2d 1151, 1155 (5th Cir.
1990) (~If no change occurs in our tort or constitutional law, the time will arrive
when [a defendant's) liability for punitive damages imperils its ability to pay compensatory claims"); Bishop v. Gen. Motors Corp., 925 F. Supp. 294, 298 (D.N.J.
1996) ("Indeed, one of the many cogent criticisms of punitive damages is that
multiple punitive [damage) liability can both bankrupt a defendant and preclude
recovery for tardy plaintiffs.").
120 233 F.3d 809 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom., Collins v. Mac-Millan
Bloedel, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 2216 (2001).
121 Collins, 233 F.3d at 810.
122 [d. at 812. Other courts have also severed punitive damages claims. For
example, in Northampton County, Pennsylvania, Judge Panella severed all punitive damages claims from discovery, pre-trial motions and trial, ruling that any
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Yet many courts have not been willing to take similar
steps to curb the impact of punitive damages claims. For instance, the Supreme Court of Montana had to decide whether
W.R. Grace & Co. could present evidence of the scope of asbestos litigation it faced as well as hypothetical average amounts
for each pending claim during a mini-trial on punitive damages. l23 The purpose of that evidence was to show that an
award of punitive damages could threaten the ability of sick
claimants to obtain compensation. 124 The trial court permitted
W.R. Grace to introduce an economic expert who performed a
series of calculations in order to approximate the potential
damages facing the company in comparison to the company's
net worth. 125
However, the Montana Supreme Court ruled that the trial
court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence - finding
that such evidence is irrelevant to the issue of punitive damages, as well as "highly speculative."126 On remand, W.R. Grace
would have been unable to introduce such expert testimony and
thus, the jury would have been unaware of the impact of a
large punitive damages award on seriously ill claimants. W.R.
Grace has since sought bankruptcy protection following a flood
of new asbestos claims.

III. A GLOBAL VIEW Is NEEDED
In mass tort litigation, such as the asbestos litigation,
when a judge in one state acts, he or she not only affects the
plaintiffs and defendants in that state, but also current and
future plaintiffs and defendants in all other states. Imagine the
frustration of one judge, coping with the impact of depleted
funds and mounting bankruptcies by setting for trial only the

discovery with respect to punitive damages would not occur until after a plaintiff
was successful on his compensatory damages claims. In re Asbestos Litig., No.
C0048GV2001000003, slip. op. at 2 (Ct. of Common Pleas of Northampton County,
Pa. Jan. 11, 2001).
123 Finstad v. W.R. Grace & Co., 2000 MT 228, 'lI 7, 8 P.3d 778, 781.
12. Finstad, 'i 46, 8 P.3d at 787.
125 Id. 'i 40, 8 P.3d at 785.
12. Id. 'i'i 48-49, 8 P.3d at 787.
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cases of those who are sick or have died from an asbestos disease, watching a judge in another state allow unimpaired
claimants to achieve compensation as part of a mass consolidated trial. With no end in sight to the asbestos litigation crisis,
courts must reexamine the procedural mechanisms and substantive rules they have adopted to determine whether they are
actually making the problem worse.
Unfortunately, courts are often hesitant to take a global
view of the problem at the expense of the citizens of their state.
For example, a state judge may be unwilling to prevent plaintiffs in his or her state from receiving punitive damages if a
similarly situated plaintiff in another state will not be precluded from receiving them. 127 This state-centric view of the litigation is not just a theory. For example, in West Virginia, the
plaintiffs submission to the West Virginia Mass Litigation
Panel actually argued that a mass consolidated trial of all
asbestos claims was necessary because of the supposed "risk of
bankruptcy filings on the part of the remaining asbestos manufacturing defendants" as well as "the drain of defendant dollars
to other litigation in other states where litigation plans are in
effect. ,,128 More specifically, the plaintiffs argued that "if the
dollars are not being demanded in West Virginia, they will be
spent elsewhere until they are all gone."129

127 See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 840 (2d Cir. 1967)
(noting that "a state otherwise willing to impose such self-denying limits might be
disinclined to do so until assured that others would follow suit").
128 Plaintiffs' Motion for Mass Trial, supra note 86, at 7.
129 Id. at 7 n.3. In two separate opinions, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals has reflected on this potential transfer of wealth in general. In Garnes u.
Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897 (W. Va. 1991), the court stated:
State courts have adopted standards that are, for the most part, not
predictable, not consistent and not uniform. Such fuzzy standards inevitably are most likely to be applied arbitrarily against out-of-state defendants. Moreover, this is a problem that state courts are by themselves
incapable of correcting regardless of surpassing integrity and boundless
goodwill. State courts cannot weigh the appropriate trade-ofTs in cases
concerning the national economy and national welfare when these tradeofTs involve benefits that accrue outside the jurisdiction of the forum and
detriments that accrue inside the jurisdiction of the forum.
Garnes, 413 S.E.2d at 905. Earlier in Blankenship u. General Motors Corp., 406
S.E.2d 781 (W. Va. 1991), the court opined:
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The lack of a coordinated approach results in compensation
based on forum rather than merit. A recent settlement illustrates this problem. In November of 1999, eighteen of the
nation's leading asbestos makers agreed to settle two of the
largest asbestos personal injury cases for $160 million. 130
However, the money was not allocated to plaintiffs based on
the severity of injury, but apparently on where they lived. 131
For example, $263,000 went to each of 246 plaintiffs who lived
in four counties in Mississippi and who suffered injuries. 182
Seven Texas plaintiffs only received $43,500 each. 133 But 2645
residents of Ohio, Indiana and Pennsylvania who had similar
injuries only received $14,000 each. 134
In the absence of federal legislation, judges must look outside their own "asbestos fiefdoms"135 and make decisions that
will help resolve the problem at a national level. They must
cooperate and work toward a global approach to these cases.
"Through [such] cooperation, judges can promote efficiency and

Indeed, in some world other than the one in which we live, where this
Court were called upon to make national policy, we might very well take
a meat ax to some current product liability rules. Therefore, we do not
claim that our adoption of rules liberal to plaintiffs comports, necessarily,
with some Platonic ideal of perfect justice. Rather, for a tiny state incapable of controlling the direction of the national law in terms of appropriate
trade-offs among employment, research, development, and compensation
for the injured users of products, the adoption of rules liberal to plaintiffs
is simple self-defense.
Blankenship, 406 S.E.2d. at 786.
130 See Labatron, supra note 63 (noting that these Mississippi cases involved
almost 4000 plaintiffs from five states).
131 See id.
132 See id.
133 See id.
134 See id.
135 Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Cooperative Strategy for Federal and State
Judges in Mass Tort Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1867, 1880 (2000). Professor
McGovern stated that the "ubiquity and massness of the tort should lead to cooperation among judges." [d. at 1867. He proposed a cooperative strategy that
judges can use to deal with the many problems associated with mass torts. Specifically, Professor McGovern offered four proposals: "(1) revise the MDL rule or
approach to make the strategy explicit; (2) revise Rule 23 to allow for more comprehensive settlements; (3) provide institutional support for state judges and for
cooperative efforts; and (4) revise the Manual for Complex Litigation to educate
judges concerning cooperative institutional strategy." [d. at 1892.
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horizontal equity in the adjudication. "136 Cooperation on a
global level will serve two immediate goals-"eliminating redundancy and promoting consistency."137 Additionally, cooperation today would assure the long-term goal of compensating
claimants who become truly sick in the future.

A. Take Steps to Control Claims by the Unimpaired
Courts must be willing to distinguish between the claims of
those who are truly sick and those who are not. The adoption of
inactive dockets by courts in Illinois, Massachusetts and Maryland is a good example of a method of controlling claims by the
unimpaired. The unwillingness of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court to recognize a cause of action by claimants who are
asymptomatic is another. Until courts take steps to control
claims by the unimpaired, court dockets will continue to be
clogged by such claims, and the limited resources available to
those who are truly sick will continue to be depleted.

B. Strictly Enforce Joinder and Venue Rules to
Prevent Forum Shopping
Courts need to be more assertive in requiring that claimants have had some substantive contact with the state in which
they have filed suit. Thousands of cases are filed in states like
Mississippi even though the claimants have no connection to
the state because Mississippi's joinder rules are so liberal.
Similarly, the streamlining of judicial procedures encourages
out-of-state residents to file suit in Ohio. One solution would be
for courts to require that plaintiffs either have been exposed to
asbestos in the state or live or work in the state in which they
file suit. Doing so would decrease forum shopping while also
unclogging state courts faced with lawsuits by thousands of
individuals who literally have no relationship to that state. Instate plaintiffs who pay taxes to keep the state courthouses
open would benefit by having their claims heard faster.

130
137

[d. at 1867.
[d. at 1872.
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C. Bring More Cases Before Fewer Judges

Many states have procedures which allow for the consolidation of cases from across that state to be transferred to a single
judge. These types of procedures have been used by states in
other mass tort contexts such as FenlPhen and silicone breast
implants. 13s A more consistent approach to the handling of
the asbestos litigation can be achieved if the number of judges
responsible for managing asbestos cases is reduced. 139

D. Provide Institutional Support
More formal mechanisms should be adopted to provide
opportunities for judges from across the country to share their
views and experiences concerning the asbestos litigation. Organizations such as the National Judicial College and ad hoc
state court committees have provided forums for improved
communication in the past, but additional steps should be taken. An organization that maintained claimant statistics, compiled case management orders and opinions and provided a
forum for increased communication would provide judges with
an important resource to draw upon as they try to balance
their need to move cases along with the need to protect both
the availability of funds to compensate the truly sick and the
rights of defendants. 14o Making this information available to
litigants may also streamline the parties' ability to work out

Id. at 1886-87.
13' One solution of course would be to revise the multi-district litigation (MDL)
rules to allow both state and federal claims to be transferred to a single judge.
As Professor McGovern explains, "[iJf the MDL statute were amended to allow the
transferee judge to oversee pretrial discovery for both federal and state cases, it
would be possible to reduce much of the redundant discovery." Id. at 1892. Additionally, if the MDL judge had greater powers, such as the ability to defer aggregation or settlement until the marketplace has spoken, or to eliminate incentives
to file claims prematurely (e.g., toll the statute of limitations), "then the premature massness that preempts a liability determination could be lessened." Id.
140 Professor McGovern
conceptualizes a National Center for State Courts,
funded by the State Justice Institute, which would establish an "institutional
mechanism . . . to share information and provide limited support" so that there
would be "a permanent method of insuring a more effective state marketplace of
litigation." Id. at 1894.
138
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case management and discovery matters with less court mvolvement.

E. Use the Tools that Already Exist
While some common-sense innovations, such as inactive
dockets, are available to the courts, many judges do not have to
look past their own court rules to improve the asbestos problem. One of the reasons that more and more asbestos claims
are being filed is that courts have been unwilling to treat asbestos claims like they would other tort claims. Judges need to
require plaintiffs to meet their burden of proof and be willing
to dismiss cases on summary judgment if that burden is not
met. Furthermore, judges need to enforce the procedural rights
of defendants and, in particular, the rights of defendants to full
discovery. The time required to enforce the rule of law now will
actually save time in the future because the incentive to file
frivolous or marginal claims will have been eliminated.

IV. THE COURTS ARE THE ONLY PRACTICAL SOLUTION
In Ortiz u. Fibreboard Corp.,l4l United States Supreme
Court Justice David Souter stated that "the elephantine mass
of asbestos cases ... defies customary judicial administration."142 As one Third Circuit Judge commented:
Unquestionably, a national solution is needed. Despite
the deteriorating situation, Congress has declined to act and
class actions are inadequate remedy ....
. . . Courts should no longer wait for congressional or
legislative action to correct common law errors made by the
courts themselves. Mistakes created by courts can be corrected by courts without engaging in judicial activism. It is judicial paralysis, not activism, that is the problem in this area. 143
527 U.S. 815 (1999).
Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 821; see also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591, 628-29 (1997) ("The argument is sensibly made that a nationwide administrative claims processing regime would provide the most secure, fair, and efficient
means of compensating victims of asbestos exposure. Congress, however, has not
adopted such a solution.") (footnote omitted).
'43 Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371, 1399 (3d Cir.) (Weis, J., dissenting) (footnote
J4I

HZ
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Even more recently, in discussing the need for a legislative
solution, one Maryland District Court Judge recognized:
the need for developing less complex and more responsive and
responsible ways of sorting out the blame and cost for industrial-age ills such as asbestosis than a system of litigation
meant to sort out competing claims to straying cattle. Yet, the
system lumbers on because no one has the incentive or initiative to change it, perhaps because everyone is so invested in
the status quo. 144

The need for a national solution has never been stronger
than it is today, where over thirty companies have been forced
into bankruptcy as a result of asbestos-related litigation, where
the number of cases on court dockets continues to grow at epidemic proportions and where claimants who get sick in the
future run the risk of undercompensation or no compensation
at all. However, without federal legislation, which remains
speculative, only the courts can take steps to improve the asbestos litigation environment. Mechanisms designed to move
cases along have failed. Courts must be willing to try new techniques, such as inactive dockets, and at the same time enforce
those rules-tort standards and forum limitations-that already exist. Whichever path they choose, the courts must do
something now before the problem gets even worse.

omitted), modified on other grounds, 13 F.3d 58 (3d Cir. 1993).
,« Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Miles & Stockbridge, P.C., 133 F. Supp. 2d 747,
751 (D. Md. 2001).
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